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13 February 1979

MEMORANDUM TO:	

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NFIB Working Group on Compartmentation

FROM:

Security Committee Staff

SUBJECT:

Working Group for Review of Security Standards for Personnel Clearances

1. A meeting of the Security Standards Working Group was held on 12 February 1979. The DoD members (less NSA) advised that they had met separately since our last meeting and wished to present a DoD position on the task given to our Working Group. The DoD position is basically that an NF1/SLC personnel security standard, if imposed upon DoD, particularly the military services, would in effect be a separate special access program which would require management, controls, and resources which are not available and could not be afforded.

- 2. They questioned the need for a separate system considering that the present access controls based upon clearance levels was considered adequate for the protection of classified materials. Unlike the IC agencies which grant clearances to applicants which are based upon standards equivalent to the highest (DCID 1/14 standards) the military grants access based upon the needs of the position in which the individual is placed with only a minor number meeting the higher clearance levels.
- 3. The main objection to the task of defining the population needing access to NFI/SLC is the lack of identifiable marking on existing NFI plus the undetermined types and quantities to be released under the proposed new system. Existing NFI is co-mingled with other classified information and material and the users could not be determined without a major survey of each and every component and unit.

4. After long discussion establishment of NFI security of intelligence sources and methe DoD members felt that it was a meeting with you to directly tasking of our group. I will Working Group at your convenience	standards for the protection thods were put forth repeatedly would be necessary to have discuss and clarify the	TAT